ribally based elites, which run ruthless security apparatuses and which do not have the confidence of even a fraction of the people in whose name they have divided the spoils of war.
With the AU mediation leaderless, there is no process today even to attempt to bring Abdul Wahid around – a difficult task, certainly, but a vital one when the alternative is, at best, the probable failure of the DPA and, at worst, a descent into chaos in which the man who created the rebel movement, inasmuch as any one person did, will be portrayed as the villain and the genocidal Sudanese government that made rebellion necessary as a disappointed partner in peace.
Abdul Wahid’s support for the DPA is what is needed to change the opinion of the displaced camps and villages of Darfur, if not the intellectuals in Khartoum and the diaspora. For most Darfurians, Abdul Wahid, not Minni Minawi, is the symbol of the “revolution.” If either of the two factional leaders has a political vision it is Abdul Wahid, no matter how poor his leadership skills and how chaotic and unreliable his negotiating style. Minawi’s Zaghawa are at most 8 percent of the population of Darfur and are themselves divided; Abdul Wahid’s Fur, historic rulers of the sultanate which gives Darfur its name, comprise 26-30 percent and are more cohesive. If either man has support outside his own tribe, it is Abdul Wahid. Not one of his key negotiators at the inter-Sudanese peace talks in Abuja was Fur; Minawi’s, by contrast, were all Zaghawa. […]
The DPA has many strong points but it also has several weaknesses – any one of which could prove fatal. There is insufficient detail about the implementation of a number of key issues; a reliance in many areas of implementation on a government that no one trusts; an absence of any accountability mechanism or human rights monitoring. In essence, Abdul Wahid and the people of Darfur are being told to put aside these concerns and to trust in assurances that the international community will ensure implementation.
But why should they trust the international community? Why should they be impressed that Sudan’s ruling National Congress Party has just committed to disarm the Janjaweed for the seventh time in two years? Why should they believe that we will punish Khartoum for violating a seventh agreement when it has done nothing to punish it for violating the first six? What is different this time around?