ious promises to Iraqi democrats down the years. It would be morally impossible, as well as politically suicidal, to walk away from them.
Given the apparently irreversible fracturing of Iraq into at least three confessional and ethnic parts, an outcome that may have been innate in the Iraqi state, we cannot hope—so runs his argument—to police or manage the sectarian horror show that has been launched by the parties of god. And we run the grave risk of being drawn into it. However, there is a possible way of saving some of our credit. If we reconfigure our military presence to the north, in the three Kurdish provinces, we can reduce the size of ourselves as a target, remain just “over the horizon” in the case of an al-Qaida challenge, be available “case by case” in the event of any appeal from the Iraqi government for help, and protect the most outstanding of our achievements in the country, which is the emergence of a relatively peaceful, democratic, and prosperous region under coalition auspices.
By definition, this would mean a much smaller and leaner force, in an area where so far no American soldier has been killed by hostile action.
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