Chernobyl on the Gulf

ld Russian incompetence provide an unexpected way out of the impasse over Iran’s nuclear program?

The question is seriously raised in both Tehran and the major Western capitals as both sides seek a way to prevent the total collapse of the negotiating process. The man who brought up the question is none other than Assistant to the President and Director of the Islamic Republic’s Nuclear Program Ghulam-Reza Aqazadeh. He was in Moscow last week, trying to get “some clear answers” about the fate of Iran’s first and so far only nuclear power plant at Bushehr. […]

When it came to revealing what he really felt about the Russian contractors, Aqazadeh minced no words.

Here is what he said in Moscow last Monday: “The Russians had no experience building nuclear plants outside their own country, especially in difficult terrain such as the one in Bushehr. The Russian Atom Stroy Export Company suffered from many weaknesses, in scientific, technological, financial and managerial fields. Had I been present when the decision was made, I would certainly not have signed the contract with them.” […]

So, if Iran does not have any nuclear power plant and is unlikely to have one working for another year or so, what is the point of picking a quarrel with the United Nations over uranium enrichment?

The Islamic republic could easily suspend uranium procession and enrichment pending the completion of its first nuclear power plant. The picture portrayed by Aqazadeh of Russian incompetence lends credence to Ahmadinejad’s assertion that the Islamic republic cannot depend on the Russian promise of providing uranium fuel for the Bushehr plant for the first 10 years of its existence. Nevertheless, it is clear that Iran does not need any uranium fuel for at least another year.

It is, therefore, possible for Tehran to announce a voluntary decision to suspend uranium enrichment for at least six months in order to allow talks to begin with the 5 permanent members of the Un Security Council plus Germany. If the talks go well, Iran could always buy uranium fuel from the 5+1 group or seek their technological support in developing Iran’s domestic processing and enrichment program. And if the projected talks develop in a way that Tehran does not like, it could always walk out and resume uranium enrichment.

The core of the current crisis consists of the suspicion that the Islamic republic is not really interested in nuclear energy and is engaged in a clandestine operation to build atomic weapons. Tehran’s behavior, insisting to go to the edge of war in order to enrich uranium for a nuclear power plant that does not exist, is bound to encourage such suspicion. Aqazadeh has shown a degree of courage rare in despotic regimes. He has exposed a project that has been mismanaged from the start and caused huge political problems without any providing any significant advantages in scientific or commercial terms. His subtext is simple: It is folly to push the nation toward war in the name of what is, after all, a piece of technological junk. He says he would not have signed the contract for what many in Iran already labeled as Chernobyl on the Gulf.