The Man at the Top

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Oil for Food deal, Mr. Annan’s Secretariat pulled in a 2.2% commission on Saddam’s oil sales, totaling a whopping $1.4 billion over the life of the program, to cover the costs of supervising Saddam. Yet somehow the Secretariat never found the funding to fully meter oil shipments, ensure full inspections of all goods entering Iraq, or catch the pricing scams that by the new estimates of Senate investigators let Saddam rake in $4.4 billion in kickbacks on relief contracts.

Mr. Annan and his aides would also have us believe that Oil for Food had nothing to do with Saddam’s smuggling of oil–which generated the lion’s share of his illicit income. But it was only after Oil for Food geared up that Saddam’s oil smuggling really took off, totaling $13.6 billion during his entire 12 years between wars, but with more than two-thirds of that–an estimated $9.7 billion–earned during the era of Oil for Food. Those were precisely the years in which Mr. Annan repeatedly went to bat to enable Saddam, under Oil for Food, to import the equipment to rebuild Iraq’s oil infrastructure, whence came all that smuggled oil.

Transparency from the start might have flagged the world and stopped the scams as things turned deeply rotten under Oil for Food. But Mr. Annan’s policy to this day has been secrecy. On Monday, Sen. Coleman summed up his subcommittee’s efforts to get at the truth, as having required so far, eight subpoenas, 13 chairman’s letters, “numerous interviews with key participants, and receipt of over a million pages of evidence” to begin to understand “the behind-the-scenes machinations of the participants in the Oil for Food program.”

“Participants” are generally understood to have been Saddam’s chosen contractors. But we need to recognize that one of the biggest of those contractors was, in effect, the U.N. itself. As Oil for Food was not only designed but expanded, embellished upon and run for more than six years under Mr. Annan’s stewardship, it became not so much a supervisory operation, but a business deal with Saddam, in which the U.N. in effect provided money laundering services, the Secretariat collected a percentage fee from Saddam–and somewhere in there, between the kickbacks, surcharges, importation of oil equipment and smuggling out of oil, they jointly ran a storefront relief operation.

Comments

  1. Steve Kingston Avatar

    I’m no fan of that tyrants’ trade union the UN, but there is a flaw in the argument above:
    ‘…it was only after Oil for Food geared up that Saddam’s oil smuggling really took off, totaling $13.6 billion during his entire 12 years between wars, but with more than two-thirds of that–an estimated $9.7 billion–earned during the era of Oil for Food.’
    But the period 1995 (when Oil-for-Food started) to 2003 represents 8 of the 12 years – two-thirds of the period between the two phases of the war (1991 and 2003) – in other words the smuggling was going on at the same rate before and after 1995, on the face of it. (Unless, that is, the article means that the $9.7 bn of smuggling came after Annan set up the OIP (1997) or after his visit to Saddam (1998), in which case the numbers would indicate an increase in the smuggling rate.) As it stands, the logic isn’t clear. There’s quite enough dirt in the UN Secretariat without invoking a weak-looking argument like this.

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