mpact on those beliefs depends on such touchy-feely concepts as trust. There was a time when philosophers would have been content to point all this out, and then sit back with a smug smile. No longer…
The subjectivity of scientific knowledge has been proved with mathematical rigour? Eh?
On reading the article it becomes clear that the author, Robert Matthews, who was attending a meeting in Seville (“organised jointly by the Group of Policy Advisers to the European Commission and the London School of Economics, with the aim of showing what philosophers could contribute to the vexed question of dealing with risk”) doesn’t know what he’s talking about.
Take the trade disputes that flare-up between America and Europe over the alleged risks posed by some or other product. One such dispute, concerning Europe’s de facto moratorium on approval or marketing of genetically modified (GM) produce, is currently in the lap of the World Trade Organisation and shows no signs of being resolved any time soon.
On the face of it, the way to do so is simple: just call in the scientists, and ask them for an objective view of the evidence. Which seems perfectly reasonable until one considers the issues involved with philosophical rigour. […]
A study by a team led by Dr Erik Millstone of Sussex University showed that trade disputes are ultimately the result of American and European policy-makers unwittingly buzzing round different fly-bottles. In the case of GM products, the Americans focus principally on the commercial risks posed, while the Europeans fret about the risk to human and ecological health.
As such, the scientific data each side wheels out to support their case is irrelevant: as their pre-existing beliefs about what is important are so different, data alone can never bring a consensus.
So he takes the entirely banal point that people approach complicated questions about the application of science according to their particular interests, and comes up with a ludicrous conclusion about objectivity being impossible. This is an old line: people differ in their interpretations, therefore there can be no correct interpretation.
Matthews also manages to bring in weather forecasting:
The mathematician Dr Lenny Smith of the LSE and Oxford University pointed out that while Mr Rumsfeld was widely ridiculed for distinguishing between “known knowns”, “known unknowns” and “unknown unknowns”, scientists and policy makers would do well to follow his example.
While science is often seen as a repository of known knowns, the discovery in the 1960s of phenomena such as chaos revealed the existence of “known unknowns”: measurable but ineluctable limits to the accuracy of, say, weather forecasts. Yet scientists and policy-makers alike have still to come to terms with the equally unavoidable “unknown unknowns” that necessarily dog any attempt to model reality.
According to Dr Smith, the consequences can be seen in the climate change debate, where scientists are routinely forced to deal with policy questions that simply cannot be answered with any real confidence.
Well no. It’s a bit complicated, the climate.
I suspect a Scoop-style mix-up here. Due to editorial confusion the Local Affairs correspondent was sent to cover the conference by mistake. Or, more plausibly, the author fancied a few days in Seville, exaggerated his philosophical credentials to the Telegraph editors, and sought the advice of an old hack. “Science and philosophy? Piece of piss, son. Just throw in a quote from Wittgenstein and a mention of Chaos Theory and you’re home and dry.” In between visits to the tapas bars our hero managed to cobble together a few sentences in line with this advice, but then, feeling pleased with himself after a few drinks, he decided to be more creative and came up with the line about the “subjectivity of scientific knowledge having been proved with mathematical rigour”. It was to prove a fatal mistake. It’s back to covering council meetings from now on.
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