territory, but it does not even command the single strongest military force. That honour belongs to Hezbollah, the Iranian-inserted proxy which, in most ways that matter, functions as the true government of Lebanon. Similarly, the Lebanese ‘state’ is unable to impose its will on the stronger de facto Hezbollah/Iran government.
All this means that two of the pillars the US envoy listed as his preferred means for implementing a new mechanism for making Resolution 1701 a reality on the ground are quite plainly not fit for purpose….
The situation regarding Blinken’s mission in Israel is essentially similar. Speculation that the removal of Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar might lead to greater flexibility in Hamas’s stance toward a ceasefire and hostage release appears to have been groundless. There is no reason to think that Mohammed Sinwar, the dead leader’s brother and replacement, will take a more accommodating stance than his sibling regarding the demand for a complete Israeli withdrawal from Gaza and the consequent survival and reconstruction of Hamas governance in the area. Hamas fighters have demonstrated in recent days their ability to still inflict significant losses on the IDF, with the killing of Colonel Ihsan Daksa on Sunday. He was the most high-ranking IDF officer to have been killed in Gaza since the beginning of the war.
But Daksa’s death does not change the general picture in Gaza. There, Hamas central command and control has ceased to exist, and its ability to fire missiles and rockets at Israel reduced to nuisance level.
In both the north and the south, Israel currently feels it has the advantage and is pushing ahead with degrading its enemies’ capacities. Neither Hezbollah nor Hamas, meanwhile, appear inclined to soften their positions, despite the losses. For as long as this situation pertains, America’s current shuttle diplomacy is likely to yield little, save generating extra air miles for Messrs. Hochstein and Blinken.
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