Mick Hartley

Personhood

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Mick Hartley

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ary under an enlightened and coherent reading of national and international law. GRASP’s mission is to expand the modern legal understanding of fundamental rights to life, physical integrity, land and freedom, so that the concept of fundamental liberty rights will transcend human-racism.

The purpose of GRASP is to create “new legal rights and protections for the non-human great apes”, and they aim to achieve this by extending the concept of personhood from its current humans-only meaning. My purpose isn’t to discuss the rights and wrongs of this: I imagine it’s a cause which will generate more and more momentum as part of the general rise of animal rights issues. There does seem to be a feeling growing, in the West at least, that we need to update our moral attitudes to the great apes alongside our increased understanding of our close evolutionary relationship with them. My interest in this is the way it’s presented, as a redefining of a term, person, to achieve moral/political aims, and I can’t help seeing a parallel in the way same-sex marriage advocates propose that marriage be redefined.

So, the Peter Tatchell line on this would be, I imagine, that it’s only prejudice in the form of speciesism, or human-racism as GRASP term it, which prevents our granting personhood to the great apes. The equivalent of Norm’s argument would be that it’s a matter of convention. What are the reasons for confining personhood to humans? The possession of morality? Not all humans are moral. Language? Not all humans can speak. Lack of body hair? Plenty of humans are hairy all over. The ability to breed with other humans? Not all humans breed. So, a humans-only personhood is merely a convention which will change over time.

My view, however, would be that the concept of person is defined such that it only refers to humans: great apes by definition can’t be people. The aims of GRASP might be better achieved by campaigning openly for better treatment of the great apes, without trying to twist our understanding of a perfectly decent word which already has a clear meaning.

Are the personhood and same-sex marriage arguments comparable? Well, the analogy’s not perfect – like all these things, there’s a gradient between convention and meaning (yes, might as well throw in Wittgenstein’s “Meaning just is use” here) – but it does seem to me to be useful as a way of thinking about the issues involved.

Comments

  1. Dom Avatar
    Dom

    The important point is that we are looking at the State’s interest in marriage. The state is only interested in the possibility of procreation. It will ask (in some countries) for a blood test, or if the couple is too closely related, etc. None of this makes any sense if the state is marrying two men (who care if they are related). The assumption in all of this more than mere convention.
    The argument that the love shared by a same-sex couple is no different that that of an opposite-sex couple, is not an argument that concerns the state or the institution of marriage. It would be outrageous if a judge refused to marry a couple because he did not believe they were truly in love.
    There is certainly some kind of union between two men or women, but whatever it is, the state’s response should be to ignore it.
    Dom

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  2. marc w. Avatar
    marc w.

    Mick,
    I haven’t read the linked article, so this point may be discussed in it – but as I see it, there are two possible claims by this ‘gorillas are people too,’ outfit.
    1: Apes are not distinct from homo sapiens
    2: We should provide rights that are roughly concomitant with the rights we afford human beings to great apes, because the differences between the two don’t merit such disparate legal treatment.
    If they’re saying the former, then that is a claim that can be examined empirically. That’s not at all the same thing as the definition of ‘marriage’ or ‘voting’ or any other legal/social convention.
    If they’re saying the latter, then it’s an argument that’s pretty similar to the idea of ‘civil unions.’ It’s not exactly the same, but it’s close. This is important, because a claim like this doesn’t rest on the ‘definition’ of human beings – they make a claim that the differences between apes and humans are small enough that the law should not take them into account. That’s a perfectly fine argument – I happen to think it’s insane, but we’ll put that aside for the moment. The point is that the either way, the argument that these guys are saying the same thing as gay marriage supporters doesn’t work – either they’re making a scientific claim with zero basis or they’re not actually arguing to change the ‘definition’ of homo sapiens.
    Dom,
    We agree on this: “It would be outrageous if a judge refused to marry a couple because he did not believe they were truly in love.” But would it be outrageous if a judge refused to marry a couple who was incapable of having kids? I mean, if the state’s interest in marriage is procreation (and I don’t think we can just assume this), then why should they?
    I agree that we’re looking at the state’s interest in marriage – and I guess I’m not convinced that there is one or should be one. If the state absolutely has to be involved in what was a religious act, then modern (evolving) concepts of rights are going to be a part of the discussion – in the US, the constitution mandates equal protection, and this concept should override historical convention. In the UK, EU or common law might be interpreted to fill the same role. If the state’s involved, then rules governing state action will apply. And that’s as it should be, it seems to me.

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  3. Mick H Avatar
    Mick H

    Marc,
    GRASP wouldn’t want to argue that there’s no distinction between humans and apes: their position is more like your second alternative. It’s a moral point: that we should treat apes as we treat people. But the way they want to present their argument is to say that we should think of apes as people. That’s where I see the parallel with the same-sex marriage issue. Their tactic for advancing a moral/political cause is to redefine a term (person in one case, marriage in the other), and argue either that to oppose them is to be guilty of discrimination (human-racism or homophobia), or that it’s just a question of convention, and when you look at the issue closely it will be apparent that there’s no good reason for limiting personhood to humans, or marriage to same-sex couples.
    No, they’re not arguing to change the definition of homo sapiens: they’re arguing to change the definition of a person.

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